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Special Series
The training of clinical psychologists during the six 
decades since the end of the Second World War has 
largely been shaped by two highly influential models: 
(a) the Boulder model (Committee on Training in Clinical 
Psychology, 1947), which reigned supreme for most of 
this period; and (b) the clinical science model (Baker, 
McFall, & Shoham, 2008; McFall, 1991), which has had a 
much shorter run but has been equally transformative. 
Both models grapple with foundational issues concern-
ing the roles of science and practice in clinical training. 
Although some people might argue that the differences 
between the two models are slight, I think there is an 
important difference of emphasis. Borrowing the collo-
quial example of walking and talking, the Boulder model 
envisions clinical psychologists who can both walk well 
and talk well, whereas the clinical science model argues 
that they should be able to do both well together.
A Hunger for Treatments
Although the Delaware Project on Clinical Science Training 
(held in October 2011) was broadly concerned with rede-
fining clinical science training (see Shoham, Rohrbaugh, 
Onken, & Cuthbert, 2014, this issue), treatment develop-
ment and dissemination quickly emerged as a focal 
concern. The National Institutes of Health model for 
intervention development (see Onken et al., 2014, this 
issue)—which spans basic research, translational 
research, efficacy research, dissemination, and imple-
mentation—was presented at the start of the conference 
and served as a reference point for many of the subse-
quent presentations and discussions.
Why has this focus on treatment development arisen? 
Even a casual observer cannot help but notice the grow-
ing number of National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
program announcements and conferences in recent years 
that emphasize developing new treatments and dissemi-
nating information concerning existing treatments. One 
reason for this growth may be the plethora of data indi-
cating that mental illness is an enormous public-health 
concern. A 1999 report from the Office of the Surgeon 
General estimated that the annual indirect cost of mental 
illness was $79 billion. According to a report by the World 
Health Organization (2004), major depressive disorder 
was the leading cause of disability in the United States 
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and Canada among those aged 15 to 44. A survey con-
ducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (2010) found that 11 million 
adults in the United States (approximately 5% of the pop-
ulation) were deemed to have a serious mental illness.
The annual federal appropriation for NIMH has ranged 
from $1.3 to $1.5 billion annually between 2003 and 2010 
(according to congressional appropriation records). This 
appropriation is a huge investment, but it is dwarfed by 
estimates of the costs of mental illness. And how are we 
doing in the battle with mental illness? This question 
begets two related questions: (a) Are we making progress 
in reducing the prevalence of mental illness (by preven-
tion, curative treatments, etc.)? and (b) Are we making 
progress in reducing the disability and costs associated 
with mental illness (by treatments and rehabilitation pro-
grams that improve functioning and reduce disability)? It 
turns out that answering the first of these questions is 
extremely difficult. Attempts to compare mental health–
prevalence data that were collected at different times and 
by different investigators are confounded by inconsisten-
cies in the ways that disorders were diagnosed and refer-
ence samples were constructed.
One of the best sources of information on changes in 
rates of mental illness over time comes from the National 
Comorbidity Survey, which was conducted from 1990 to 
1992 and then replicated a decade later from 2001 to 
2003 (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). The results 
from these surveys are not encouraging. Examining the 
prevalence of disorders in the United States, that is, peo-
ple between the ages of 18 to 54 who met Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; 
DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria 
for a disorder during the preceding 12-month period, 
there is no indication that the nation’s mental health 
improved. Rather, the prevalence actually increased 
slightly over the decade (from 29.4% to 30.5%). In terms 
of the second question, reducing disability and improv-
ing function, there have been enormous problems with 
treatment dissemination. In one study (also based on the 
National Comorbidity Survey), the delay between the 
onset of symptoms and receiving appropriate treatments 
was from 6 to 8 years for mood disorders and from 9 to 
23 years for anxiety disorders (Wang et al., 2005). 
Although inequities in access and use of mental-health 
services undoubtedly play a significant role in explaining 
these delays, they also reflect the continuing challenges 
involved in getting community-based practitioners to use 
empirically supported treatments (McHugh & Barlow, 
2010; Weisz et al., 2009). With these extremely sobering 
numbers and the attendant increases in public pressures, 
the increasing emphasis on treatment development and 
dissemination is not surprising.
Caught Between Two Worlds: DSM and 
Research Domain Criteria
The National Institutes of Health model for treatment 
development (see Onken et al., 2014) affords little atten-
tion to the assessment of mental illness. This is probably 
because the model was formulated under the assumption 
that the DSM would continue to serve as the primary 
basis for organizing treatment development in the future. 
Thus, the targets of treatment development and dissemi-
nation would largely be Axis I (e.g., bipolar disorder) and 
Axis II (e.g., borderline personality disorder) disorders. 
However, by the time the Delaware Project occurred, 
there clearly was an 800-lb gorilla in the room. Many of 
the attendees were quite familiar with the new NIMH 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2010b, 2013), having participated in the various 
RDoC planning meetings. RDoC (discussed in detail later) 
does not focus on DSM clinical syndromes, such as bipo-
lar disorder or borderline personality disorder. Rather, it 
focuses on behaviors, neural circuits, biomarkers, and 
dimensions of functioning. In an RDoC-centric world, a 
treatment development model would also need to place 
major emphasis on assessment, including developing, 
evaluating, and disseminating new assessment methods 
that could be used to identify targets for intervention and 
to evaluate treatments. As an attendee at the Delaware 
Project (and a participant in the RDoC process), I found 
myself often thinking about how radically different treat-
ment development and dissemination might look in an 
RDoC-centric world.
The Present Article
This article focuses on two clinical science training issues 
that are directly relevant to treatment development and 
dissemination. The first issue is the value of problem-
based learning as a general pedagogical model for train-
ing clinical scientists. In problem-based learning, the 
emphasis is less on mastering procedures and applying 
existing solutions and more on learning how to identify 
problems and to design, implement, and assess solutions. 
The article illustrates the problem-based approach using 
the specialty clinic training model that was developed at 
Berkeley (Levenson, Cowan, & Cowan, 2010) as a new 
way to provide applied clinical practicum training. The 
second issue concerns the implications that RDoC has for 
clinical science training. Here, the article discusses ways 
that clinical science training will need to change to 
embrace the opportunities and overcome the obstacles 
associated with the RDoC approach. The connective 
threads between the two parts of this article are (a) the 
value of problem-based pedagogical approaches that 
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prepare clinical students to be creators, discoverers, 
assessors, and disseminators; and (b) the importance of 
training clinical students in ways that will enable them to 
play central and significant roles in the future, and not be 
marginalized, as new approaches are taken to the assess-
ment and treatment of mental illness.
Problem-Based Learning: Specialty 
Clinics at Berkeley
In both Boulder-model and clinical science-model training 
programs, students typically receive part of their applied 
clinical training in the classroom and part in the clinic. In 
the classroom, they learn about theories of intervention 
and about research on therapy process and outcomes. In 
the clinic, two pedagogical approaches are common: (a) 
Students learn particular treatment procedures and then 
use them with appropriate clients or (b) students are 
thrown into the deep end with clients, initially acting in 
accordance with their readings and intuitions and later 
shaped by guidance and feedback from supervisors. Even 
before the emergence of the empirically supported treat-
ment movement (Chambless & Hollon, 1998; Chambless & 
Ollendick, 2001), students were made aware of approaches 
that had a stronger evidentiary base. Thus, for example, 
students trained in the 1970s and 1980s typically learned 
client-centered therapy (Rogers, 1951, 1957) for dealing 
with a broad range of psychological issues and systematic 
desensitization (Wolpe, 1958) for treating fears and pho-
bias. Central elements of client-centered therapy were sup-
ported by empirical evidence (e.g., the importance of 
therapist empathy for fostering change in the client; Truax 
et al., 1966). Similarly, support for the efficacy of system-
atic desensitization was quite strong (Paul, 1968; Paul & 
Shannon, 1966).
At the same time, students in these eras might also 
have been exposed to a rogues’ gallery of more exotic 
approaches, including psychodrama, movement therapy, 
primal scream therapy, psychodynamic group dream 
interpretation, bioenergetics, and Reichian therapy. Each 
of these treatments had its passionate advocates, care-
fully articulated rationales, elaborate procedures, and 
unique charms. However, to my knowledge, none were 
ever evaluated using even minimally adequate research 
methods. Fast forward to contemporary times, and what 
has happened to all of these procedures (both those with 
and those without empirical support)? Although some of 
these treatments undoubtedly continue to have their 
advocates, few, if any, are still being taught to graduate 
students in clinical science programs.
The ephemeral nature of clinical 
science procedures
Ultimately, all procedures in clinical science come with 
an expiration date. Whether it is therapeutic practices, 
assessment techniques, research questions, research 
measures, or data analytic approaches, all have their 
moment on center stage and then the spotlight moves 
elsewhere. If this observation is correct, then we do our 
students a great disservice by training them primarily to 
be proceduralists, regardless of whether that involves 
training them to administer a particular set of empirically 
supported treatments or to apply a particular set of 
research methods to a particular set of research ques-
tions. In both clinical practice and research, our students 
are best served if we prepare them to identify problems, 
synthesize available knowledge, develop solutions, test 
those solutions, and inspire others to use and advance 
what they have learned. This is certainly not to say that 
training should be content or procedure free but, rather, 
that learning content and mastering procedures should 
not be the primary goals of doctoral-level clinical science 
training.
From boulders to bowlers: The two-hat 
problem
The Boulder model (Committee on Training in Clinical 
Psychology, 1947) envisioned clinical psychology train-
ing that included the concepts and skills needed for 
both science and practice. As I have noted previously,
In its canonical form, the scientist-practitioner model 
envisioned a tightly integrated, seamless blending of 
science and practice. But lurking behind this 
idealized unity was a far less integrated reality. Most 
scientist-practitioner programs were characterized by 
two parallel tracks: the science track, which was 
supervised by the academic faculty, and the practice 
track, which was supervised by the clinical faculty.  
. . . Invariably, we found ourselves adopting a “two-
hat” metaphor, speaking of wearing our “scientist 
hat” in the laboratory and our “clinician hat” in the 
Psychology Clinic . . . the hats represented different 
paradigms with wholly different epistemologies. 
When donning the scientist hat, our assertions were 
typically based on tested theory and empirical 
evidence. When donning the clinician hat, our 
assertions were often based on untested theory and 
accumulated clinical experience. (Levenson et al., 
2010, p. 198)
This two-hat problem has been endemic in clinical 
psychology training for decades. For example, Meehl 
(1973) made similar observations when explaining why 
he stopped attending case conferences (e.g., in his view, 
critical scientific thinking was often left at the door). 
Perhaps the most disheartening part of the situation 
was the ready adoption of this language by students 
who hearing faculty use these terms, soon became 
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comfortable with partitioning their own thinking about 
science and practice in these ways.
Specialty clinic training at Berkeley
In 1999, two of my colleagues1 and I in Berkeley’s clinical 
psychology program decided to develop a new problem-
based learning model for practicum training that would 
explicitly combine science and practice. Reflecting our 
research and clinical interests, we decided to focus on 
treatment for couples.
Integrating research and practice. To forge the inte-
gration between research and practice, we eschewed the 
standard practice of having a separate intervention the-
ory course that preceded the practicum experience. 
Instead, students enrolled in a yearlong combined course 
and practicum. By design, all participating faculty (aca-
demic and clinical) were full participants in all aspects of 
the specialty clinic, including a weekly 30-min faculty 
meeting, a 2-hr weekly seminar (which also periodically 
included a case conference once students began seeing 
clients), all treatment evaluation activities, and case 
supervision. Students received 30 min of supervision 
each week per case. A faculty supervisor was assigned to 
each case so that each student would be supervised by 
as many of the participating faculty as possible.
Choosing the target problem. The first specialty clinic 
had eight students. The seminar began with general read-
ings on couples, couples therapy, and couples research. 
A schedule was established for critical implementation 
milestones that needed to be reached by particular dates 
(e.g., deciding on the focal problem for the clinic, final-
izing the evaluation, beginning client recruitment, begin-
ning treatment). For this first specialty clinic, the group 
considered a number of quite specific intervention foci 
(e.g., same-sex couples, newlyweds) but finally decided 
on a more general focus—couples dealing with relation-
ship issues related to life transitions. This decision was 
based on the need for this kind of service in the com-
munity and the evidentiary basis available for designing 
an intervention. In subsequent iterations of the couples 
clinic, the problem-selection process sometimes led to a 
narrower focus. For example, one year the focus was on 
couples dealing with a potentially terminal medical con-
dition, whereas another year the focus was on couples 
dealing with dementia.
Encompassing the full process of treatment devel-
opment. Regardless of the focal problem selected, each 
specialty clinic encompassed the full range of activities 
related to treatment development: (a) reviewing current 
theories and research relevant to foundational processes 
related to the identified problem (e.g., attachment, emo-
tion regulation); (b) reviewing current theories and 
research relevant to treatment of the identified problem; 
(c) designing an evidence-based, time-limited interven-
tion; (d) marketing the intervention (i.e., arranging for 
referrals, talking to relevant community organizations, 
advertising in local media); (e) designing a treatment 
assessment (which always included a traditional pretreat-
ment and posttreatment battery as well as briefer mea-
sures that were completed each week); (f) delivering the 
treatment under supervision; (g) assessing the efficacy 
of the treatment; and (h) preparing a report or collo-
quium presentation on the training and the efficacy of 
the intervention.
Student and faculty participation in designing 
the learning experience. In the specialty clinic 
model, students are often asked, “What do you need to 
learn to be able to work effectively with clients?” This 
question guides a host of activities, including discus-
sions about topics for assigned reading, experts to invite 
to talk to the seminar, visits to community agencies, 
and audiovisual training materials to view. Once 
treatment has started, there are discussions about addi-
tional readings, cases to present to the entire group, and 
consultants to bring in for help with particular issues 
that arise. Specialty clinic students and faculty all par-
ticipate fully in making these decisions. This models an 
approach that we expect students will use in the future 
when they are faced with the need to expand their 
expertise to address new clinical (and research) 
problems.
The treatment toolbox. We have found it useful to 
identify a set of procedures and materials that can be 
used by students when working with couples. Most of 
these procedures and materials are identified from 
reviewing relevant literatures, but some are designed in-
house to deal with particular issues. For example, we 
often use a video-recall procedure adapted from couples 
research (Levenson & Gottman, 1983) in which couples 
are videotaped while they discuss a marital problem. 
They later watch the tape together with their therapist, 
stopping to examine moments at which troublesome 
interactions occur (e.g., demand-withdraw cycles; 
Christensen & Heavey, 1990). These can lead to psycho-
educational interventions, role-plays of alternative 
ways of dealing with the interactions, homework assign-
ments, and so forth. Although far from meeting double-
blind, random-assignment clinical research standards, 
data collected as part of our weekly assessments are use-
ful in gauging the utility of particular tools. For example, 
in one year’s treatment evaluation, we found that session-to- 
session increases in marital satisfaction for couples were 
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greatest following the session in which the video-recall 
tool was used.
Student and faculty reactions. Although clearly 
labor intensive and somewhat nerve racking (i.e., the 
pressures of starting the specialty clinic from scratch each 
year without knowing in advance exactly where the 
clinic would be headed), we found the specialty clinic 
model to be an extremely satisfying teaching experience. 
A good indicator of this satisfaction is that we have now 
offered the couples clinic six times (perhaps most telling, 
my cofounders came back postretirement to colead one 
of these iterations). Student evaluations have been uni-
formly positive. For a book chapter written about this 
project (Levenson et al., 2010), we contacted all previous 
student participants and asked them to reflect on this 
experience and how it had influenced their careers. Many 
of their responses were included in the chapter. To sum-
marize, there was a strong sense that participation in the 
couples clinic was a transformative and empowering 
experience, one that truly seemed to capture the elusive 
goal of more fully integrating science and practice.
Scaling up and reaching out. After several successful 
iterations of the couples clinic, other program faculty 
began using the model to offer practicum experience in 
additional areas. In 2005, the clinical science program 
officially adopted the specialty clinic model as the pri-
mary training model for applied clinical training. Over 
the years, specialty clinics have been offered by other 
faculty in areas including (a) mood disorders, (b) emo-
tion awareness and management, (c) immigrant mothers 
dealing with divorce, and (d) sleep disorders. In many 
iterations, prominent clinicians from the community were 
invited to colead specialty clinics with core academic fac-
ulty.2 This involvement of academic and clinical faculty 
provides an important collaborative model for students. 
This approach can also pay dividends in helping dissemi-
nate knowledge about evidence-based practice into the 
general clinical community and in getting invaluable 
input from frontline clinicians about intervention strate-
gies that are being developed based on clinical research.
RDoC: New challenges and 
opportunities for clinical science 
training
RDoC aims to provide a new way of classifying mental 
disorders that is based on dimensions of neurobiology 
and observable behavior (Cuthbert & Insel, 2010b, 2013). 
This approach is quite different from that found in the 
current psychiatric diagnostic systems (e.g., the American 
Psychiatric Association’s 2013 DSM-5 and the World 
Health Organization’s 2010 International Classification 
of Diseases, ICD-10, and upcoming 11th revision, ICD-
11), which seek to identify particular syndromes on the 
basis of presenting signs and symptoms. Although the 
framers of RDoC have gone to some length to note that 
it is designed as a research classification system rather 
than one intended for routine clinical use (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013), it may be difficult to maintain this distinc-
tion. If RDoC generates a new body of exciting, clinically 
relevant research findings, the “just for research” mantra 
will likely be drowned out by questions concerning what 
this system can do to help relieve the burden of mental 
illness. Regardless, clinical scientists are going to want to 
be deeply involved in this new approach to clinical 
research. Thus, their students will need to be trained in 
ways that enable them to function productively in an 
RDoC-centric world.
The problems inherent in the DSM have been well 
documented over the decades (Cuthbert & Insel, 2010a; 
Widiger & Sankis, 2000). Although significant progress 
has been made in increasing the reliability of certain 
diagnoses, the ultimate validity and utility of these diag-
noses is undercut by a host of factors, including (a) high 
levels of comorbidity across disorders, (b) lack of speci-
ficity in etiology, (c) lack of specificity in pharmacologi-
cal and behavioral treatments, (d) particular symptoms 
(e.g., fear) appear in multiple disorders, and (e) broad 
syndromes (e.g., schizophrenia, major depression) have 
multiple variants that could be better characterized as dif-
ferent disorders.
Moreover, as the tools for assessing the genes, mole-
cules, and neural circuits that determine behavior have 
become dramatically more precise and refined in recent 
years, attempts to link them with the broad, heteroge-
neous DSM syndromes have seemed increasingly mis-
guided. Finally, increases in the reliability of DSM 
diagnosis have not produced improvements in the sober-
ing public-health statistics described earlier in relation to 
the prevalence of mental illness, the associated burden, 
the need for more effective treatments, and the chal-
lenges of getting the best available treatments to those 
most in need. For all of these reasons, there is a building 
momentum for trying a different approach.
RDoC: The basic framework
RDoC focuses on behavior and neurobiology. It begins 
by asking what the range of behaviors are that the brain 
has evolved to carry out and what the neural systems 
are that are responsible for implementing these behaviors 
(Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). Thus, for a behavior to 
be included in RDoC, there must be a plausibly associ-
ated brain circuit. Because the granularity of RDoC is 
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constrained by the state of current neurobiological 
knowledge, the behavioral units are called constructs 
(leaving the door open for additional validation and revi-
sion on the basis of future knowledge).
RDoC next specifies the range of variation in each 
behavioral construct from normal to abnormal. Thus, 
behaviors in RDoC are inherently neither good nor bad 
but, rather, represent dimensions that encompass a range 
of functioning. Moreover, these dimensions are not nec-
essarily unipolar. For many behaviors, abnormality is 
associated with both extremes (e.g., having too much or 
having too little fear are both problematic).
The October 2012 iteration of RDoC (Cuthbert & Insel, 
2013) dramatically illustrates how it differs from the DSM 
syndromes. In this version, five domains are elaborated 
along with their associated behavioral constructs: (a) 
negative valence domain (acute threat, potential threat, 
sustained threat, loss, frustrative nonreward), (b) positive 
valence systems (approach motivation, initial responsive-
ness to reward, sustained responsiveness to reward, 
reward learning, habit), (c) cognitive systems (attention, 
perception, working memory, declarative memory, lan-
guage behavior, cognitive control), (d) systems for social 
processes (affiliation and attachment, social communica-
tion, perception and understanding of self, perception 
and understanding of others), and (e) arousal/modula-
tory systems (arousal, biological rhythms, sleep-wake).
RDoC also provides a framework for examining behav-
ioral constructs at multiple levels of analysis, including 
genes, molecules, cells, physiology, behavior, and self-
reports. In addition, it specifies laboratory paradigms that 
are used to assess these constructs. Thus, RDoC applies 
precise behavioral and biological measures developed in 
the laboratory to clinical phenomena that have tradition-
ally been assessed using clinician and caregiver observa-
tions and patient self-reports.
Clinical psychology in an RDoC-
centric world: An imaginary scenario
Jim, a 50-year-old man with no prior history of major 
psychiatric illness, is experiencing what he describes as 
emotional “numbness.” This is manifested in a general 
low level of enthusiasm and lack of enjoyment for work 
and family activities, things that used to be sources of 
great joy. He has been effective enough at work to keep his 
job and his family has remained intact, but he expresses 
concerns about how his problems will affect his work and 
family in the future.
Jim makes an appointment at the psychological ser-
vices center at a major university for evaluation and 
treatment. He participates in a daylong assessment that 
includes structured clinical interviews, functional and 
structural neuroimaging, genotyping, and laboratory-
based observational tests of emotional and cognitive 
functioning. The results of the assessment are reviewed by 
a multidisciplinary team that represents psychology, psy-
chiatry, pharmacology, social work, neurology, affective 
science, and cognitive science. The team concludes that 
(a) the emotional deficits are characterized by blunted 
responding in facial expressive behavior, but autonomic 
responding is at normal levels; (b) the emotional deficits 
are more pronounced in experienced affect than in antic-
ipated affect; (c) there are pervasive deficits in executive 
functioning, especially in the realm of measures of cogni-
tive flexibility; (d) volumetric analysis of structural brain 
scans indicate that brain regions involved in emotion 
generation and regulation show no evidence of acceler-
ated neurodegeneration; (e) diffusion tensor imaging 
indicates that major frontal-subcortical networks are 
intact; (f) genetic analyses reveal a pattern of allelic vari-
ations in serotonin and dopamine genes consistent 
with high levels of environmental sensitivity; and (g) the 
medical history includes a cardiac arrhythmia that is 
being treated with a high dose of a broad spectrum 
beta-blocker.
In consultation with the multidisciplinary team, a 
clinical scientist formulates a treatment plan that includes 
(a) systematic evaluation of the extent to which the cur-
rent cardiac medication is contributing to the depressed 
emotional functioning to determine whether medication 
changes are indicated, (b) careful examination of the 
patients’ home and work environments to identify contex-
tual triggers and reinforcers that are contributing to 
reduced emotional reactivity and formulating a plan 
for modifying these environmental factors, (c) targeted 
intervention that focuses on enhancing moment-to-
moment emotional experience and expression, and (d) a 
training program designed to improve low-level executive 
functioning.
The plan is to treat Jim for 3 months and then, if there 
is no significant improvement, to refer him for evaluation 
for suitability for two new treatments for emotional blunt-
ing, one using a targeted drug delivery system that 
increases serotonin levels in mesolimbic brain areas criti-
cal to emotion generation and the other using deep-brain 
stimulation to activate these same brain areas combined 
with transcranial magnetic stimulation to inhibit emotion 
regulatory centers in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Implications for clinical science 
training: How and where do we fit in?
The foregoing scenario is, of course, fictional. It attempts 
to extrapolate from the RDoC framework and current sci-
entific trends to envision what the practice of clinical 
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psychology might look like in the not-too-distant future. 
How accurately this scenario portrays that future remains 
to be seen, but this kind of a science-based, multidisci-
plinary approach to case formulation and treatment is 
already being used in some areas of medicine and could 
easily be applied to mental illness as well.
If we assume that this envisioning of the post-RDoC 
world is at least partially accurate, begs the question: Are 
clinical scientists being trained to play major roles in this 
new world or will they become marginalized and irrele-
vant? For those with long memories, predictions of an 
imminent revolution in the practice of clinical psychol-
ogy along with an associated tsunami of changes ripping 
through traditional clinical training may seem familiar. 
Are we in fact on the verge of a true revolution in clinical 
science, or will this be yet another instance that proves 
the adage “The more things change, the more they remain 
the same”? The ultimate answer to this question will be 
revealed only over time. But for now, I believe that there 
is great value in seriously entertaining the possibility that 
the changes that lie ahead for clinical psychology are 
going to be pervasive and profound. If this does prove to 
be the case, then we should do everything possible to 
ensure that graduates of our training programs are pre-
pared to assume leadership roles in this new version of 
clinical science.
Coursework. In an RDoC-centric world, clinical science 
students will need to take substantial coursework in 
genetics, physiology, anatomy, and neuroscience, areas 
that are not typically required in current clinical science 
curricula. They will also need to take courses in the other 
areas of psychology that are most relevant to RDoC 
domains, including cognition, emotion, social, develop-
ment, learning, and personality. Such courses will need 
to provide focused, in-depth exposure to the newest par-
adigms, theories, and methods, a far cry from the “broad 
and general” exposure currently required for American 
Psychological Association (APA) accreditation of clinical 
science programs (APA Commission on Accreditation, 
2009). In addition, rather than having separate courses 
that cover normal and abnormal behavior, all courses 
(e.g., including those that consider cognition, emotion, 
and learning) will need to address the full range of func-
tioning. In many departments, such courses do not cur-
rently exist, creating challenges in curriculum development 
for faculty in both clinical and nonclinical areas.
Research training. Program faculty will need to con-
sider the level of expertise their students should have in 
the various subareas that are relevant to the new clinical 
science. If the goal is to train students who are capable 
of assuming leadership roles in the multidisciplinary 
research teams that will work on these complex, 
multilevel problems, then it will be critical that students 
gain experience working on these kinds of problems in 
these kinds of teams. Work in the laboratory of the pri-
mary mentor will need to be augmented with experi-
ences working with other mentors and in other 
laboratories if students are to obtain the necessary 
breadth and depth of research experience. Problem-cen-
tered learning will play a critical role as clinical science 
students learn how to incorporate multiple research per-
spectives and collaborate with scientists from other areas 
of psychology and from other disciplines.
In the current version of clinical science training, stu-
dents often struggle to find time for research with a 
single mentor amid the demands of required courses, 
teaching assistantships, clinical work, and other obliga-
tions. In this new era, as clinical science students engage 
in multiple training rotations and pursue demanding, 
time-intensive research projects, it will be critical to find 
ways to make more time available for research training.
Practicum training. Practicum training will also need 
to change in the new clinical science era. Opportunities 
will need to be developed that allow for extensive obser-
vation and direct exposure to a range of patients with 
different kinds and severities of dysfunction. Because 
many forms of dysfunction will be identified and treated 
in laboratory settings, a significant amount of experience 
with clinical assessment and treatment will need to be 
obtained in these kinds of settings to in addition tradi-
tional clinical training sites. With the increasing impor-
tance afforded to underlying neural circuits, clinical 
science students will benefit from extensive exposure to 
neuropathology in addition to psychopathology. Particu-
larly valuable will be experience with neurological disor-
ders that produce psychiatric-like syndromes (e.g., 
affective blunting in frontotemporal dementia, hallucina-
tions in Lewy body disease, depression in Parkinson’s 
disease, and affective dysregulation in amyotrophic lat-
eral sclerosis; Levenson & Miller, 2007; Olney et al., 2011).
The new era will be characterized by many different 
treatment options, some traditional and some not. In 
terms of the former, behavioral and psychosocial treat-
ments will continue to play an important role, but they 
will be oriented toward smaller units of dysfunction (e.g., 
reward prediction errors) rather than to larger problems 
(e.g., anhedonia) or syndromes (e.g., schizoaffective dis-
order). Other treatments will be more biological, target-
ing the neural circuits and genes that underlie specific 
areas of functioning. Already, there are treatments that 
target neural circuits using deep-brain stimulation 
(Holtzheimer et al., 2012), transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion, and biofeedback. As new drug delivery systems 
become available, pharmacological treatments may 
become more targeted and more effective and have fewer 
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side effects. New research on gene expression and new 
methods for controlling the action of genes (Deisseroth 
et al., 2006) represent another frontier for new treatment 
approaches.
Treatment will always be a moving target. As new 
understanding of dysfunction and new approaches to its 
alleviation are developed, new treatments will come on 
line. Thus, problem-centered learning with the goal of 
developing expertise in the entire process of treatment 
development and dissemination will continue to be 
critical.
Assessment training. Clinical science students will 
need to gain experience with a broad range of new 
assessment techniques, including genetic assays, struc-
tural and functional neuroimaging, observational coding 
of behavior, and laboratory-based paradigms (e.g., for 
testing executive functioning, emotion regulation, and 
reward estimation). Moreover, clinical scientists will play 
an increasingly important role in the development of 
new, effective assessment methods that can be moved 
from the laboratory to the university clinic and ultimately 
into the hands of community practitioners. Again, prob-
lem-centered learning that provides students with experi-
ence with the full process of developing and disseminating 
assessment tools will be of the highest value.
Obstacles to overcome
When it comes to mental health, change will not come 
easily. Any change in how mental illness is conceptual-
ized, classified, or treated will have profound impacts on 
practitioners, scientists, educators, insurers, advocacy 
groups, drug companies, patients, families, and many, 
many others. As compelling as the RDoC approach might 
seem, it is bound to encounter obstacles.
Inertia in academia. The scope of changes envi-
sioned here would have profound implications both for 
clinical science programs and for their parent psychology 
departments. Many faculty members, trained in more tra-
ditional clinical psychology models, may feel unprepared 
to teach and supervise research and practica in these 
new ways. Getting consensus for these kinds of changes 
will be an enormous challenge. Although a wait-and-see 
approach may have its appeal, this may be a once-in-a-
generation opportunity for clinical science programs to 
assume leadership roles in moving their departments and 
the mental-health system in important new directions.
The DSM. The DSM-5 has numerous improvements and 
refinements that should help advance the reliability of 
diagnosis. However, as noted earlier, there are many rea-
sons to doubt that it represents the best approach for 
guiding future research, assessment, and clinical practice. 
Here again, change will not come easily. Every diagnosis 
in the DSM has an associated cottage industry of mea-
sures, theories, treatments, paradigms, affordances, reim-
bursements, streams of research funding, and careers that 
create a huge vested interest in maintaining some version 
of the status quo.
Accreditation. Clinical science programs are now con-
fronted with two accreditation options. The new kid 
on the block is the Psychological Science Accreditation 
System (PCSAS), which as of this writing has accredited 
21 research-focused clinical science programs. PCSAS 
accreditation places heavy emphasis on outcomes, care-
fully examining whether graduates are creating and 
applying science in their careers. Because it affords less 
emphasis on process, it allows programs maximal flexi-
bility in the ways they train their students to produce the 
desired outcomes. This flexibility will greatly facilitate the 
changes in training necessary in an RDoC-centric world.
The grand dame of accreditation is the APA Commission 
on Accreditation. Because APA accreditation is required 
for professional licensure in all states and for certain 
internship placements and careers, even PCSAS-
accredited clinical science programs still seek APA 
accreditation. Compared with PCSAS, APA accreditation 
places far greater emphasis on the training process. APA 
accreditation recognizes alternative training models 
(including clinical science); however, the core require-
ments for curriculum and practicum experiences are the 
same for all models (APA Commission on Accreditation, 
2009). An area of increasing contention in recent years 
has been the requirement that students receive broad and 
general training (Zlotlow, Nelson, & Peterson, 2011) 
through graduate-level coursework in a number of desig-
nated areas of psychology (e.g., human development, 
biological aspects of behavior, cognitive and affective 
aspects of behavior, history and systems). For clinical sci-
ence programs, and especially in an RDoC-centric world, 
it makes more sense to have students take focused and 
specific courses that cover the more specialized, cutting-
edge knowledge in the other areas of psychology 
(Berenbaum & Shoham, 2011). Unfortunately, the rift 
between clinical science programs and APA accreditation 
on these and other training issues seems to be widening, 
not narrowing.
RDoC vulnerabilities. RDoC was not designed to be a 
compendium of all behaviors. Rather, the RDoC frame-
work explicitly requires each included behavioral con-
struct to have a plausibly associated brain circuit. In 
addition, by considering behaviors to have manifestations 
that fall on dimensions of normal to abnormal, RDoC 
behaviors need to have manifestations that are associated 
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with mental illness (RDoC is not as explicit about this, 
but it is implied). These requirements are extremely use-
ful for building the catalogue of RDoC behaviors, but 
they quickly run up against the limits of current knowl-
edge. Some behaviors and brain-behavior relationships 
are well understood, whereas others are not (including 
those involving some of the highly complex cognitive, 
emotional, and social functions that are often disrupted 
in mental illness). Thus, RDoC is vulnerable to false posi-
tives (behaviors that are included that should not be) and 
false negatives (behaviors that are not included that 
should be).
The founders of RDoC were clearly aware of these 
limitations, envisioning the framework as organic and 
evolving in response to new knowledge about brain-
behavior relationships (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). However, 
even with greater knowledge, there will always be a sub-
jective element in determining at what point the evidence 
is sufficient for including or excluding a particular behav-
ior. Despite RDoC still being in its early stages of devel-
opment, the stakes are already high. A behavior that is 
included in the framework will be eligible for future 
RDoC-earmarked research funding; one that is excluded 
will have a more difficult path. For some potential RDoC 
inclusions, specialized assessment techniques, para-
digms, and even interventions already exist. As scientists, 
we all have blind spots when it comes to the work we do 
and care passionately about. Under these conditions, 
RDoC, like the DSM before it, faces the potential prob-
lems of guild interests and personal preferences trump-
ing objective decisions.
An unfortunate firewall. Within psychology, research 
on mental illness has historically largely been the exclu-
sive province of clinical psychology. In fact, students 
from other areas of psychology are often actively 
excluded from receiving clinical training and from being 
exposed to clinical phenomena. A strong movement 
at NIMH in recent years toward a greater investment in 
mission-critical research and the related increased 
emphasis on translational science has encouraged scien-
tists from nonclinical areas of psychology to work on 
problems related to mental health and illness. These 
trends could be strengthened by providing some applied 
clinical training and exposure to clinical phenomena to 
students in nonclinical areas of psychology. Broadening 
training in this way would dramatically increase the num-
ber of scientists who work on issues related to mental 
illness in the future. Fresh eyes combined with new 
energy, methods, and insights can help lead to the kind 
of scientific breakthroughs that are sorely needed in 
mental illness research. RDoC, with its stated agnosticism 
regarding existing DSM diagnoses and its focus on behav-
iors that have well-established neural underpinnings, 
seems particularly well suited to this more inclusive 
approach to training.
Conclusions
The Delaware Project on Clinical Science Training high-
lighted the need for progress in developing treatments 
for mental illness and in disseminating available treat-
ments. The importance of developing scientifically based 
treatments is also clearly seen in the increased emphasis 
at NIMH on translational research (NIMH, 1999), the 
emergence of the clinical science movement (Baker 
et al., 2008), and the new RDoC framework for guiding 
mental-health research (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). All of 
these trends have profound implications for clinical sci-
ence training. But what kind of training will be needed to 
produce clinical scientists who thrive in this new era, 
assume leadership positions in the field of assessment 
and treatment development, and help lead the charge for 
needed reforms in the diagnosis and treatment of mental 
illness?
This article addresses two issues related to this ques-
tion. The first is the value of problem-based learning as a 
pedagogical model for clinical science training. As 
applied to clinical practicum training, in this approach, 
students learn how to identify treatment needs, design 
evidence-based treatments, market interventions, evalu-
ate treatment efficacy, and disseminate the products and 
outcomes to others. This approach is an alternative to 
training that primarily prepares students to be experts in 
administering a set of evidence-based treatment proce-
dures, most of which will likely be supplanted by new 
approaches in the future. Here pedagogical models and 
public-health finances converge, with ample evidence 
that evidence-based treatments can be delivered as effec-
tively and at much lower cost by mental-health specialists 
with associate, bachelor’s, and master’s degrees com-
pared with those with doctoral training (Berman & 
Norton, 1985; Christensen & Jacobson, 1994).
The specialty clinic model at Berkeley is an example 
of how problem-based learning can be implemented for 
practicum training in a typical research-oriented clinical 
science program. The fact that this model is still going 
strong after 12 years suggests that it is both feasible and 
sustainable. Moreover, the model integrates science and 
practice in ways that have been quite elusive in tradi-
tional two-hat systems in which applied clinical training 
follows a very different epistemology, uses a different 
kind of language, and is staffed by different faculty than 
clinical research training.
The emergence of RDoC shows promise of being a 
major game changer. Symptom-based and dimensional 
approaches to clinical diagnosis have certainly been pro-
posed before (e.g., Krueger, Watson, & Barlow, 2005). 
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However, RDoC differs in its focus on small units of 
behaviors that are plausibly linked to underlying neural 
circuits, molecules, and genes that can be precisely mea-
sured and that span a range of normal to abnormal func-
tioning. At this juncture, it is impossible to know whether 
RDoC will endure and flourish or just be another interest-
ing idea that did not gain sufficient traction to survive. 
But the weight of the NIMH bully pulpit, the commitment 
of a significant portion of NIMH research funding to 
RDoC-based research, and the promise of having a set of 
mental illness–relevant constructs that are of sufficiently 
fine granularity to forge links with recent advances in 
neuroscience and molecular genetics may create the per-
fect storm for fomenting a revolutionary change in the 
understanding, assessment, and treatment of mental 
illness.
An RDoC-centric world would have profound implica-
tions for clinical science training. The kinds of knowl-
edge and expertise needed to navigate the RDoC 
framework successfully draw heavily on neuroscience 
and genetics and on laboratory paradigms used to mea-
sure behavioral functioning developed in other areas of 
psychology. Clinical science students currently do not 
receive a great deal of training in these areas, even in the 
most science-oriented training programs. It is clear that 
with so much that is new, this is another excellent oppor-
tunity for problem-based learning approaches, which do 
not give students answers (which in these domains do 
not yet exist) but, rather, give them the tools to seek 
those answers. Faced with the disparities between the 
demands of the RDoC world and current training empha-
ses, and confronted with powerful impediments to 
change (e.g., APA accreditation requirements, existing 
allegiances to the DSM), clinical science may soon find 
itself at a crossroads. Clinical science training can remain 
where it is, waiting on the sidelines to see what changes 
actually occur, and then try mightily to catch up. Or the 
field can begin to change now, seize the moment, figure 
out how to move the immovable, and set out to train a 
new generation of students who can help lead the way 
into the next era of clinical science.
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